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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Daniel Mendoza was fourteen years old when he was arrested for 
murder.1  Raised by a single mother, Mendoza’s family struggled to 
secure basic necessities.2  The family also lived in a dangerous 
neighborhood, and by age fourteen, Mendoza had joined a local gang.3  
Police arrested Mendoza when he and several other gang members beat 
a forty-four-year-old man to death.4  The attack erupted out of a turf war 
for gang territory.5  Jose Maria Barajas, the victim of the killing, was not 
a member of a rival gang but simply lived nearby.6  As a fourteen-year-
old gang member charged with murder, Mendoza was tried in criminal 
court and faced a life sentence in an adult prison.7  He was then given an 
opportunity that most juveniles tried in criminal courts are not: 
Mendoza was allowed to remain in juvenile custody while he finished 
high school and then proceeded to take online college courses.8  His case 
was transferred back to juvenile court shortly after finishing his 
education, and Mendoza earned early release based on his progress.9  
Now Mendoza, who will be twenty-four this year, is a graduate of the 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Manhattan College. 
 1 Robert Salonga, Reformed Bay Area Teen Convicts Push Pending Bill to Spare Young 
Offenders, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/
2018/09/26/reformed-teen-convicts-push-pending-bill-to-young-offenders. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Salonga, supra note 1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FUTURES DENIED: WHY CALIFORNIA 
SHOULD NOT PROSECUTE 14- AND 15-YEAR-OLDS AS ADULTS 21 (2018), https://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/supporting_resources/futures_denied.pdf.  
 8 Salonga, supra note 1. 
 9 Id. 
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University of California at Davis.10  Mendoza also earned the Brandon 
Harrison Youth Leader/Youth Organizer Award in 2018, recognizing 
him for his leadership.11  Mendoza credits the opportunities he was 
given in the juvenile system for his change, calling them “integral to 
growth.”12  Once facing life-long imprisonment in the criminal system, 
Mendoza now refers to himself as “a taxpayer and a productive member 
of society.”13 
Mendoza has been a strong advocate of Senate Bill 1391,14 an 
amendment to California’s Welfare and Institutions Code, which 
governs juvenile offenders that are tried and sentenced in criminal 
(instead of juvenile) court.15  Senate Bill 1391 bans the transfer of 
juveniles under the age of sixteen to criminal court, regardless of the 
alleged offense.16  Mendoza was vocal in telling his story as an example 
of how the juvenile system allows and enables young juvenile offenders 
to change.17  Mendoza points out that almost all juvenile offenders will 
get out eventually: “We have to decide whether we want them to come 
out worse than when they came in.”18  In September of 2018, California 
Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 1391, amending the Welfare 
and Institutions Code as of January 2019.19  The amendment, still 
commonly referred to as Senate Bill 1391, has been criticized by District 
Attorneys’ offices,20 journalists,21 and victims of crimes perpetrated by 
 
 10 Daniel “Data” Mendoza, FATHERS & FAMILIES OF SAN JOAQUIN, https://www.ffsj.org/
leadership/daniel-data-mendoza (last visited Jan. 8, 2020). 
 11 Julia Ann Easley, Convicted of Murder as Youth, UC Davis Student to be Honored for 
Leadership, UC DAVIS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/convicted-
murder-youth-uc-davis-student-be-honored-leadership. 
 12 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 21. 
 13 Salonga, supra note 1. 
 14 Id. 
 15 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2019). 
 16 S.B. 1391, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 17 Salonga, supra note 1. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Alexei Koseff, Jerry Brown Limits Prosecution of Minors to ‘Work Toward a More 
Just System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2018, 8:50 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/
news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article219287990.html. 
 20 See, e.g., Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior 
Court, Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018) (arguing that Senate Bill 1391 
is unconstitutional and criticizing its removal of judicial discretion to consider juvenile 
punishments in the “most dangerous cases”). 
 21 See, e.g., Marcos Bretón, Gov. Brown, If You Don’t Veto a Bill to Protect Young Killers, 
You Create a Legacy of Pain, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 16, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.sac
bee.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/marcos-breton/article218396140.html 
(arguing that Senate Bill 1391 does not protect the public or respect victims). 
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fourteen and fifteen-year-olds.22  Much of the criticism focuses on the 
constitutionality of the amendment, which is currently being questioned 
in lower courts throughout California.23  But its constitutionality is not 
the only controversy surrounding Senate Bill 1391; arguments 
regarding public safety, fairness, accountability, and punishment have 
been raised against the amendment as well.  While multiple sources, 
primarily some California courts,24 have rebutted arguments regarding 
Senate Bill 1391’s constitutionality, a comprehensive reply to all of the 
opposition to the amendment is lacking. 
This Comment will fill that void by identifying and addressing the 
major arguments, outside of the constitutionality debate, against Senate 
Bill 1391.  Part II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the 
juvenile justice system’s history and purpose in both the United States 
as a whole and California.  Part III of this Comment will explain and 
refute major criticisms of Senate Bill 1391: (1) the argument that Senate 
Bill 1391 is soft on juvenile crime and puts public safety at risk, and (2) 
the argument that Senate Bill 1391 goes too far in completely 
eliminating prosecutorial and judicial discretion in the transferring of 
youth under sixteen years old to criminal court.  This Comment will 
show that Senate Bill 1391 furthers the main goal of the juvenile justice 
system by promoting juvenile rehabilitation and protects juveniles of 
differing backgrounds from disparate treatment while maintaining 
public safety through other provisions of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
The history of juvenile justice systems throughout the United 
States makes clear that the main purpose of these systems is to 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders and steer them away from the criminal 
 
 22 See, e.g., id. (quoting Nicole Clavo, mother of a murder victim, calling Senate Bill 
1391 “‘a slap in the face’ to the families of victims”); Darrell Smith, Sacramento’s 
‘Community of Victims’ Fight Law Shortening Sentences for Young Killers, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(March 31, 2019, 2:40 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article2283878
09.html (quoting Victoria Hurd, daughter of a murder victim, stating that Senate Bill 
1391 “hits victims of atrocious crimes below the belt”). 
 23 E.g., People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555 (Ct. App. 2019) 
(upholding the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391); People v. Superior Court (I.R.), 251 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2019) (upholding the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391); 
People v. Superior Court (Alexander C.), 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712 (Ct. App. 2019) (upholding 
the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391); O.G. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904 
(Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional). 
 24 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555; People v. Superior 
Court (I.R.), 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158; People v. Superior Court (Alexander C.), 246 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 712. 
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path.  This Part will demonstrate why courts have deemed it 
appropriate to treat juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders 
and how juvenile treatment focuses on rehabilitation.  This Part will also 
describe the distinct goals of California’s juvenile justice system, as well 
as how the state has sought to achieve these goals through the Welfare 
and Institutions Code.  Finally, this Part will provide an overview of 
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which governs the 
transfer of juveniles to the criminal system, and how it has been 
amended in recent years, concluding with Senate Bill 1391. 
A.  The United States 
Before the mid-nineteenth century, juvenile justice systems did not 
exist, and criminal courts tried both minors and adults for their crimes.25  
But the mid-nineteenth century saw a shift in the treatment of juveniles 
as cities and states throughout the country opened Houses of Refuge.26  
New York State opened the first House of Refuge, or juvenile 
reformatory school, in 1825.27  Houses of Refuge were a pretext to 
juvenile justice systems, with the United States’ first juvenile court 
opening in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899.28  As juvenile courts were 
created throughout the nation, the doctrine of parens patriae became 
prevalent for governing these new juvenile court systems.29  Under the 
doctrine of parens patriae, the state—specifically the judge—acted as a 
“parent” and determined what was in the minor’s best interests, 
focusing specifically on youth offenders’ rehabilitation.30  This doctrine 
even allowed juvenile courts to curtail the wishes of the biological 
parent in certain contexts.31  Because the judge was to act in the minor’s 
best interest, the procedural safeguards and due process rights 
traditionally afforded to criminal defendants were unavailable to 
 
 25 NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE: PANEL ON 
JUVENILE CRIME: PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND CONTROL 157 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001). 
 26 See Chaz Arnett, Criminal Law: Virtual Shackles: Electronic Surveillance and the 
Adultification of Juvenile Courts, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 399, 414 (2018). 
 27 Our City Charities.; The New-York House of Refuge for Juvenile Delinquents. N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 1860), https://www.nytimes.com/1860/01/23/archives/our-city-
charities-the-newyork-house-of-refuge-for-juvenile.html. 
 28 NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, supra note 25, at 157. 
 29 See Tavil Peterson, Mandatory Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: A Deviation 
from the Purpose of the Juvenile Justice System and A Violation of Their Eighth Amendment 
Rights, 52 REV. JUR. U. INTER. P.R. 377, 378 (2018). 
 30 See id. 
 31 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“Acting to guard the general 
interest in youth’s well-being, the State as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s 
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and 
in many other ways.”). 
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juvenile offenders.32  Under this early, paternalistic version of the 
juvenile justice system, the primary focus and purpose of the juvenile 
court were to further the minor’s rehabilitation and best interests.33 
Judicial, cultural, and legislative changes in the late twentieth 
century created a more punitive juvenile justice system, shifting the 
system’s focus away from rehabilitation and more and more toward 
punishment.34  Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Kent v. United States,35 In re Gault,36 and In re Winship37 
likened the country’s juvenile justice system to the criminal justice 
system by extending to juvenile offenders the due process rights 
afforded to criminal defendants.  During the 1980s and 1990s, a national 
rise in crime led to changing views on juvenile justice and the adoption 
of “get-tough” laws38 by states throughout the country.39  The notion of 
the juvenile “super-predator,” juvenile offenders who committed 
violent crimes for trivial reasons, became popular, prompting states to 
change legislation regarding the juvenile justice system.40  By 1999, all 
but one state had enacted laws allowing or making it easier for juvenile 
offenders to be transferred to criminal courts.41 
Although the attitudes behind “get-tough” laws persist today, 
recent years have seen a growing movement toward recognizing the 
differences between minors and adults and how those differences affect 
juvenile justice.  In 2005, the Supreme Court prohibited death sentences 
for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, which held that death sentences for 
 
 32 Peterson, supra note 29, at 383–84. 
 33 Id. at 378–79. 
 34 DANIELLE MOLE & DODD WHITE, TRANSFER AND WAIVER IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
2–3 (2005). 
 35 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (holding that before being transferred to criminal court, 
juvenile offenders are entitled to a hearing, representation by counsel, access to social 
records, and a statement of the reasons for the transfer). 
 36 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55–57 (1967) (holding that juvenile defendants are entitled to 
notice of the charges, a right to counsel, a right to confrontation, and a right against self-
incrimination). 
 37 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
required in juvenile proceedings). 
 38 NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, supra note 25, at 155 (“In response to the 
increase in violent crime in the 1980s, state legal reforms in juvenile justice, particularly 
those that deal with serious offenses, have stressed punitiveness, accountability, and a 
concern for public safety, rejecting traditional concerns for diversion and rehabilitation 
in favor of a get-tough approach to juvenile crime and punishment.”). 
 39 Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing 
Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 266 
(2013). 
 40 MOLE & WHITE, supra note 34, at 2–3. 
 41 Id. at 3. 
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conduct committed as a minor violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment.42  Similarly, in 2012, the Supreme Court 
also prohibited mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile 
crimes in Miller v. Alabama.43  In these cases, the Court focused on three 
primary distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders to explain 
why different punishments are warranted: (1) “[a] lack of maturity and 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more 
often . . . result[ing] in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions;” (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures” and “have less control . . . over their 
own environment;” and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well 
formed as that of an adult.  The personality traits of juveniles are more 
transitory, less fixed.”44  Roper and Miller affirmed that despite harsher 
laws, the primary purpose of the juvenile justice system remains to be 
rehabilitation.45  While the rationale and decisions in Roper and Miller 
have prevented minor offenders from being sentenced to the most 
serious criminal punishments, thousands of juveniles continue to be 
tried and sentenced as adults.46 
B.  California 
California’s juvenile justice system also strives, in theory, to 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders.  California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office 
stated that while both the juvenile and criminal justice systems strive to 
achieve public safety, “California’s adult system also has punishment of 
offenders as a goal, while California’s juvenile justice system has a 
different goal—treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.”47  
The California Legislature explains that, unlike the adult criminal justice 
system, many agencies (such as schools, social workers, and community 
 
 42 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005). 
 43 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
 44 Roper, 543 U.S. 551 at 569–70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 50 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) 
(alteration in original)); Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
569–70 (2005)). 
 45 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010)) 
(“Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s 
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult.’”). 
 46 Jessica Lahey, The Steep Costs of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/the-cost-of-
keeping-juveniles-in-adult-prisons/423201. 
 47 CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST OFF., JUVENILE CRIME — OUTLOOK FOR CALIFORNIA PART V, 
https://lao.ca.gov/1995/050195_juv_crime/kkpart5.aspx (1995). 
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programs) are involved in the juvenile justice system to help facilitate 
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.48 
1.  The Welfare and Institutions Code 
In California, the procedures for transferring, trying, and 
sentencing a juvenile in criminal court are governed by the Welfare and 
Institutions Code.49  Welfare and Institutions Code § 707 sets out when 
a juvenile offender may be transferred to criminal court, the procedures 
by which a judge may transfer the juvenile to criminal court, and the 
factors a judge should consider when deciding on a motion to transfer a 
juvenile to criminal court.50  Section 707 reflects a number of 
amendments to these procedures made over the past several years.51  
The most significant of these amendments have been Proposition 21 
(the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Initiative of 2000),52 
Proposition 57 (the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016),53 and 
Senate Bill 1391,54 passed in September 2018 as a part of the Equity and 
Justice Package and effective as of January 2019. 
Proposition 21 exemplified the “get-tough” laws that characterized 
juvenile justice legislation in the 1990s.55  It allowed prosecutors to file 
certain charges against minors directly in criminal court without a 
fitness hearing or transfer order from a juvenile court judge.56  Under 
Proposition 21, minors aged fourteen and older accused of committing 
major crimes, such as murder and specified sex offenses, could be tried 
and sentenced in criminal court at the prosecutor’s discretion.57  
Proposition 21 contained “a new list of direct file categories and specific 
provisions making judicial waiver easier for prosecutors by expanding 
the list of crimes that generate a presumption of transfer and reducing 
the burden of proof in the judicial proceeding.”58 
 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (2019). 
 50 Id. § 707(a)–707(b). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See generally Prop. 21 § 26 (2000). 
 53 See generally Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016). 
 54 See generally Cal. ALS 1012, S.B. 1391 (Cal. 2018). 
 55 Feld, supra note 39, at 266. 
 56 Jennifer Taylor, California’s Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile Injustice, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 983, 990–91 (2002). 
 57 Id. at 990. 
 58 Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly 
Revisionist History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2010). 
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Proposition 57, which limited the broad prosecutorial discretion 
allowed by Proposition 21 and put the question of juvenile transfer into 
the hands of juvenile court judges, amended California’s Welfare and 
Institutions Code § 707 in 2016.59  Proposition 57 stated five specific 
goals with regard to sentencing both juvenile and adult offenders:  
(1) Protect and enhance public safety; (2) Save money by 
reducing wasteful spending on prisons; (3) Prevent federal 
courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners; (4) Stop the 
revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, 
especially for juveniles; (5) Require a judge, not a prosecutor, 
to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.60  
Proposition 57 eliminated Proposition 21’s “direct file” approach and 
required a transfer hearing to be held before any juvenile could be 
transferred to criminal court.61  This amendment still allowed juveniles 
under the age of sixteen to be transferred to criminal court for certain 
crimes pursuant to a transfer hearing.62  This changed, however, with 
the enactment of Senate Bill 1391 in 2018. 
2.  Senate Bill 1391 
In September of 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed 
Senate Bill 1391, which flatly prohibits the transfer of juveniles under 
the age of sixteen to criminal court.63  Under Senate Bill 1391, juveniles 
under sixteen years of age must remain in the juvenile system and be 
sentenced as juveniles, requiring detainment in juvenile correctional 
facilities rather than adult prisons.64  According to the Legislative 
Counsel’s Digest on the bill, it 
repeal[s] the authority of a district attorney to make a motion 
to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal 
jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have 
committed a specified serious offense when he or she was 14 
or 15 years of age, unless the individual was not apprehended 
prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, thereby 
amending Proposition 57.65   
With this marked change to the juvenile justice system has come 
controversy.  Even Governor Brown stated that it was a “difficult bill” to 
 
 59 Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016). 
 60 Id. § 2. 
 61 Alana Murphy, Recent Court Decisions and Legislation Affecting Juveniles: United 
States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 215, 229 (2017). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Koseff, supra note 19. 
 64 Id. 
 65 LEGIS. COUNS. DIG., Cal. ALS 1012, S.B. 1391 (Cal. 2018). 
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sign,” but ultimately did so, asserting that California “should continue to 
work toward a more just system that respects victims, protects public 
safety, holds youth accountable, and also seeks a path of redemption and 
reformation whenever possible.”66  In the year and a half since Senate 
Bill 1391 was passed, criticism has included challenges to its 
constitutionality, leading to a split among California lower courts.67  This 
Comment, however, will not address the constitutionality of Senate Bill 
1391 and will instead focus on the other arguments against the 
amendment. 
III.  ADDRESSING THE CRITICISM OF SENATE BILL 1391 
There are two traditional categories of criminal punishment: 
utilitarianism and retributivism.68  Utilitarian purposes seek to achieve 
benefits for the largest number of people.69  There are five typical 
mechanisms of utilitarian punishment: rehabilitation, incapacitation, 
specific deterrence, general deterrence, and denunciation.70  These 
purposes tend to have crime-control effects and benefit society at 
large.71  Purposes of punishments relating to retribution, on the other 
hand, have to do with notions of justice rather than practical benefits.72  
There are various versions of retribution, which differ in what exactly 
the principle entails.73  Generally, however, the principles of retribution 
direct that offenders must be punished simply because they deserve to 
be punished for their crimes.74  In other words, offenders should be 
sentenced based on their blameworthiness for their crimes.75  Section A 
of this Part will discuss the utilitarian concerns that opponents and 
supporters have raised regarding Senate Bill 1391, primarily public 
safety and rehabilitation.  Section B will focus on rebutting arguments 
grounded in retributivism, focusing on accountability for juvenile 
offenders.  Section C will show how prosecutorial and judicial discretion 
play a large role in how these theories of punishment are applied to 
 
 66 Koseff, supra note 19. 
 67 E.g., Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior Court, 
Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018) (arguing to Santa Clara County 
Superior Court that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional). 
 68 Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 69 (2005) (referring to 
utilitarian and non-utilitarian, or retributivist, purposes of punishment). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 70. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See discussion infra, Section III.C.3. 
 74 Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 853, 854 (2015). 
 75 Frase, supra note 68, at 73. 
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juveniles and explain why Senate Bill 1391’s removal of discretion 
altogether is warranted when it comes to juvenile transfer and 
punishment. 
 
A.  Utilitarian Concerns: Senate Bill 1391’s Response to Juvenile 
Crime 
1.  Senate Bill 1391 Maintains Public Safety by Accounting for 
Irredeemable, Violent Juvenile Offenders 
One argument at the forefront of Senate Bill 1391’s criticism is that 
it will let dangerous juvenile criminals incapable of being rehabilitated 
serve shorter sentences and get released earlier than they would in the 
criminal system.76  At the extreme of this argument are those that raise 
concerns about letting psychopathic, violent killers back on the 
streets.77  Opponents of Senate Bill 1391 rest this argument on the fact 
that in California’s juvenile system, offenders are released by the age of 
twenty-five.78  Opponents often point to horrendous crimes by juveniles 
under the age of sixteen, highlighting calculated, cruel murders to 
demonstrate that “some hearts cannot be reformed so easily” and that 
some fourteen and fifteen-year-olds “cannot be rehabilitated in a way 
that protects the public.”79  In an opinion piece for the San Francisco 
Chronicle, Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeffrey Rosen argued 
that Senate Bill 1391 removes a “safety net” previously in place and, 
under the amendment, the “only choice . . . is to cross our fingers that 
[these murderers] got killing out of [their] system[s].”80 
The vast majority of juvenile offenders who are affected by Senate 
Bill 1391 are not psychopaths.  But, in the rare cases in which a 
psychopathic juvenile does receive the benefit of the amendment, the 
implications of letting such a dangerous criminal back on the streets are 
 
 76 See, e.g., Bretón, supra note 21 (“The fear is that [Daniel Marsh, who was convicted 
of murder at fifteen years old] would be released by juvenile detention officials at 25.”); 
Jeffrey Rosen, Initiative Reformed How California Tries Teens, but New Law Removes 
Safeguards, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/
Initiative-reformed-how-California-tries-teens-13413031.php (“Senate Bill 1391… is 
based on a dangerous contention about teenagers: that they grow out of murder.”). 
 77 See Bretón, supra note 21. 
 78 Nate Gartrell, Two Men Accused of Gunning Down Woman in Richmand Park Could 
Benefit if Brown Signs Reform Bills, EAST BAY TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.east
baytimes.com/2018/09/28/a-young-woman-was-gunned-down-in-a-richmond-park-
fate-of-both-defendants-may-hinge-on-gov-browns-pen. 
 79 Bretón, supra note 21. 
 80 Rosen, supra note 76. 
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significant.  Doing so, however, is not the “only choice”81 under Senate 
Bill 1391.  The Welfare and Institutions Code provides mechanisms to 
extend incarceration of juvenile offenders that are deemed “physically 
dangerous to the public.”82  Under § 1800 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code, the Division of Juvenile Facilities may request that the prosecuting 
attorney petition the court for an order allowing the Division to 
maintain jurisdiction and control over juveniles “physically dangerous 
to the public because of the person’s mental or physical deficiency, 
disorder, or abnormality that causes the person to have serious 
difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior.”83  The prosecutor 
may then determine whether or not to file such a petition.84  Similarly, 
§ 1800.5 allows the Board of Parole Hearings to request the Division of 
Juvenile Justice to review any case in which the Division of Juvenile 
Facilities has not filed a request pursuant to § 1800 for any juvenile that 
the Board deems “physically dangerous.”85   
These safeguards provided for in §§ 1800 and 1800.5 adequately 
protect public safety from those offenders for whom rehabilitation is 
unlikely.86  Under these sections, fourteen and fifteen-year-olds who 
commit violent crimes and have not been rehabilitated by the age of 
twenty-five likely will not be released back onto the streets as many 
opponents of Senate Bill 1391 suggest.  Extending incarceration is an 
option for such offenders, making Senate Bill 1391’s impact on public 
safety minimal.  Thus, while such safety considerations are important, 
other sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code reveal that allowing 
dangerous murderers back into the public is not a likely effect of the 
amendment. 
Senate Bill 1391 is also not likely to affect the deterrence of juvenile 
crime, yet another reason that the amendment will not threaten public 
safety.  Current evidence indicates that more severe consequences, such 
as sentencing juveniles who have committed violent crimes as adults, 
does not impact deterrence: “The power of deterrence in serious 
adolescent offenders appears to rest in the perceptions of the certainty, 
not the severity, of the punishment for criminal involvement . . . . [The] 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1800.5 (2019). 
 83 Id. § 1800(a). 
 84 Id. § 1800(b). 
 85 Id. § 1800.5. 
 86 See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1965) (affirming the trial 
court’s decision to extend the defendant’s detention for two years after his twenty-first 
birthday pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1803); In re J.F., 74 Cal. Rptr. 464 
(Ct. App. 1969) (affirming the trial court’s decision to extend the defendant’s detention 
under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1800.). 
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severity [of sanctions] will do little to change behavior.”87  Thus, 
although critics of Senate Bill 1391 suggest that punishing juveniles 
more severely by sentencing them as adults will deter juvenile crime, 
that notion is contrary to current evidence.  In fact, it seems that 
increasing the probability of being punished, rather than the severity of 
the punishment, is a much more effective way to promote deterrence of 
juvenile crime.88 
2.  Senate Bill 1391 Furthers the Juvenile Justice System’s 
Goal of Rehabilitation 
Criticism of Senate Bill 1391 that focuses on the amendment’s 
“soft” approach to juvenile crime fails to fully appreciate another 
utilitarian principle, which is the ultimate goal of the juvenile justice 
system, rehabilitation.  Both the United States and, specifically, the state 
of California have specified that rehabilitation is the primary goal of the 
juvenile justice system.89  Sentencing juveniles accused of committing 
serious crimes as adults, rather than allowing them to remain in the 
juvenile system, undermines the importance of this goal and hinders 
juvenile rehabilitation.  This is because the juvenile justice system is 
more effective at accomplishing juvenile rehabilitation than the criminal 
justice system: a 2010 analysis of all existing studies of juveniles in the 
criminal justice system done by the Department of Justice concluded 
that juvenile offenders that were transferred to criminal courts had 
higher recidivism rates than those offenders kept in the juvenile 
system.90  The analysis found this to be especially true for juveniles who 
had committed violent crimes.91  Similarly, a 2011 regression analysis 
found that juvenile offenders who were transferred to the criminal 
 
 87 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 12 n.21 (citing Edward P. Mulvey, Carol A. 
Schubert, Alex Piquero, Pathways to Desistance—Final Technical Report, Document 
No. 244689 (submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice) (Jan 2014), at 13, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants244689.pdf); see also Frase supra note 68, 
at 72 (“[O]ffenders are more sensitive to the probability of punishment than to its 
severity.”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 75 (2010)) (“‘A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom [for juvenile 
offenders],’ but must provide ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’); CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST OFF., supra note 47 
(“California’s adult system also has punishment of offenders as a goal, while California’s 
juvenile justice system has a different goal—treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile 
offenders.”). 
 90 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 12. 
 91 Id. 
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system, and therefore were not placed in the treatment and intervention 
programs available in the juvenile system, had higher recidivism rates.92   
These conclusions indicate that juvenile offenders sentenced in the 
juvenile system, especially those convicted of violent crimes, show more 
rehabilitative progress than those sentenced in the criminal system.  
This is unsurprising considering that juveniles sentenced to adult 
prisons “lose out on the educational and psychological benefits offered 
by juvenile-detention facilities.”93  Although adult prisons also strive to 
rehabilitate inmates, juvenile facilities provide more opportunities to do 
so because rehabilitation is the main goal of the juvenile system, while 
the criminal justice system is more punitive.94  While still detaining and 
punishing minor offenders, juvenile facilities foster environments that 
are more conducive to rehabilitation by engaging detained youth in 
“exercise, education, and pro-social activities necessary for proper 
development.”95  Juvenile facilities offer resources such as increased 
presence of well-trained staff, dayrooms, classrooms, gyms, and 
education programs that are less commonly available in adult prisons.96 
The juvenile justice system’s focus on rehabilitation also makes it 
better equipped to address and treat mental illnesses, which play a 
significant role in juvenile crime.  Placement in adult prison can 
exacerbate mental illness or, even in seemingly mentally healthy youth, 
cause mental health issues to arise.97  A 2002 study published by the 
National Institute of Health evidences the strong correlation between 
mental illness and juvenile crime, finding that approximately seventy 
percent of youth in the juvenile justice system in Cook County, Illinois,98 
which was used as a sample for the United States generally, suffer from 
at least one mental illness.99  Among the seventy percent of detained 
 
 92 Kristin Johnson, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, & Jennifer Woolard, Disregarding Graduated 
Treatment: Why Transfer Aggravates Recidivism, 57 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 756, 767–68 
(2011). 
 93 Lahey, supra note 46. 
 94 See CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST. OFF., supra note 47. 
 95 Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America, 
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 7 (2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf. 
 96 Id.  
 97 See discussion infra Section III.C.3. 
 98 Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1134 (2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2861992/pdf/nihms171651.pdf.  The authors chose to use Cook County as 
a sample because it is urban (and most juvenile offenders come from urban areas), it is 
ethnically diverse, and Illinois’s criteria for detaining juvenile offenders are similar to 
those of several other states.  Id. at 1134. 
 99 See id. at 1133. 
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youth suffering from at least one mental illness, approximately sixty 
percent met the criteria for three or more psychiatric disorders.100  The 
prevalence of mental illnesses among juvenile offenders is another 
reason to keep juveniles in more rehabilitation-focused juvenile justice 
systems rather than the criminal system.  Minors detained in juvenile 
facilities are “required to participate in individualized services to 
address behavioral health, disabilities, trauma, and other needs.”101  
Thus, transferring youth offenders that suffer from mental illnesses to 
criminal court is not likely to address the underlying problem.  
Remaining in the juvenile system, on the other hand, can give such 
juveniles a better chance of receiving treatment for their illnesses, 
allowing them a greater chance of rehabilitation.102 
Although critics have raised utilitarian concerns about public 
safety and rehabilitation, the effects of Senate Bill 1391 are consistent 
with utilitarian theory.  According to utilitarian theory, the costs or 
harms of a given punishment should not outweigh its benefits.103  Since 
Senate Bill 1391 leaves §§ 1800 and 1800.5 in place,104 it does not 
negatively impact public safety.  Additionally, research suggests that it 
is the probability of punishment, not the severity of punishment, that 
has the strongest deterring effect.105  Therefore, punishing juvenile 
offenders with more severe, criminal sentences likely will not impact 
deterrence.  On the other hand, the juvenile justice system is more 
effective at rehabilitating juvenile offenders.106  Since Senate Bill 1391 is 
unlikely to affect deterrence and public safety while benefiting 
rehabilitation, it embodies utilitarian principles because its benefits will 
outweigh its costs. 
B.  Retribution: Accountability in the Juvenile Justice System 
Opponents of Senate Bill 1391 also allege the amendment lacks 
retribution, suggesting that even if juvenile offenders are not totally 
“getting away with” their crimes, they are somehow getting off easier 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 19. 
 102 Id. (“The rehabilitative services available in the adult criminal justice system pale 
in comparison to what is offered to youth in the juvenile justice system.”). 
 103 Frase, supra note 68, at 72. 
 104 See S.B. 1391, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§§ 1800–1800.5 (2019). 
 105 Frase, supra note 68, at 72. 
 106 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 18 (“The juvenile justice system is designed 
to address the needs of youth by offering age-appropriate support and rehabilitative 
services. . . . It is also a system that was designed to address the needs of youth who 
commit serious crimes.”). 
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than they deserve by being sentenced as juveniles instead of adults.  
Some challenge Senate Bill 1391 because it allows juveniles accused of 
heinous crimes to serve out sentences in “comfy juvenile facilities,” 
rather than adult prisons.107  Critics have even characterized the 
amendment as a “slap in the face” or “hit below the belt” to victims.108  
These opponents recognize that the goal of the juvenile justice system is 
to rehabilitate juvenile offenders from their criminal directions but 
argue that juveniles who commit serious, horrendous crimes like 
murder, rape, and kidnapping, cannot be rehabilitated and deserve to 
serve sentences in adult prisons, which are less focused on 
rehabilitation and more focused on punishment.109  Critics bolster this 
argument by noting that juveniles are only tried as adults in “rare”110 
cases when “the crimes are so bad,”111 particularly in “serious” crimes 
such as “murder, arson, robbery, rape or kidnapping,”112 implying that 
the minors sentenced to adult prisons deserve to be there. 
This argument fails to account for many realities of California’s 
juvenile justice system.  First, while sentencing only violent juveniles 
convicted of horrendous crimes as adults may have been a goal of the 
system, statistics show that goal was not always achieved.  From 2007 
to 2016, only twenty-eight percent of minors under sixteen years old 
prosecuted in criminal court were accused of homicide.113  Robbery 
accounted for twenty-four percent and assault accounted for eighteen 
percent, while kidnapping and lewd or lascivious behavior only 
accounted for two percent each.114  In 2018, nearly seventy percent of 
juvenile cases transferred to adult court were for violent offenses.115  
This means that thirty-eight percent of juvenile offenders were still 
given the most severe and life-altering punishment of being sentenced 
as adults for nonviolent crimes, undermining the argument that only a 
few truly dangerous and deserving youth are subject to transfer. 
 
 107 Lloyd Billingsley, Senate Bill 1391 Functioning as the MS-13 Empowerment Act, 
CAL. GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2019), https://californiaglobe.com/section-2/senate-bill-1391-
functioning-as-the-ms-13-empowerment-act. 
 108 Bretón, supra note 21; Smith, supra note 22. 
 109 See Bretón, supra note 21; Rosen, supra note 76. 
 110 Bretón, supra note 21. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Koseff, supra note 19. 
 113 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 8. 
 114 Id. at 8 n.16. 
 115 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 92 (2018), https://data-open
justice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-07/Juvenile%20Justice%20In%20CA%202
018%2020190701.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2020). 
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This argument also fails to recognize that the juvenile justice 
system can rehabilitate minors while simultaneously achieving some 
kind of retribution and holding juvenile offenders accountable for their 
crimes.  Harsher punishments can actually violate retributive principles, 
which help set the outer limits of appropriate punishments based on an 
offender’s blameworthiness.116  When a punishment goes beyond the 
limits of the offender’s culpability, it no longer conforms with the notion 
of retribution.117  Thus, retribution will be different for adult offenders 
than it is for juvenile offenders, who are inherently less blameworthy 
for their crimes.118  Additionally, evidence shows that juvenile 
correctional facilities are not actually “comfy”119 but rather resemble 
adult facilities and face ongoing issues of violence and neglect.120  Most 
juveniles who are found to have committed “serious or violent” offenses 
are placed in state, rather than county, juvenile facilities.121  The Center 
on Juvenile and Criminal Justice’s report highlights how state juvenile 
facilities are similar to criminal prisons.  For example, the hiring 
practices of these state facilities prioritize a corrections background 
over a background in youth development.122  The report also shows that 
the remote locations of the facilities keep families apart;123 that the 
facilities’ schools fail to provide basic education;124 and that the 
rehabilitative programs are “rendered less effective by DJJ’s 
[Department of Juvenile Justice] violence and prison-like setting.”125  
Findings also show that violence and fear run rampant, requiring 
juveniles to maintain a level of “hyper-vigilance needed to stay safe.”126  
Thus, it is clear that youth held accountable through the juvenile system 
rather than criminal sentencing are not let off easy for their crimes.  
State juvenile facilities are not comfy, pleasant places to be; they are 
 
 116 See Frase, supra note 68, at 76 (discussing the theory of limiting retributivism). 
 117 See id. 
 118 See discussion infra, Section III.C.3. 
 119 See Billingsley, supra note 107 (referring to juvenile facilities as “comfy” in 
comparison to adult prisons). 
 120 See MAUREEN WASHBURN & RENEE MENART, CTR. ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
UNMET PROMISES: CONTINUED VIOLENCE AND NEGLECT IN CALIFORNIA’S DIVISION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
7 (2019), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/unmet_promises_continued_
violence_and_neglect_in_california_division_of_juvenile_justice.pdf. 
 121 See id. 
 122 Id. at 21. 
 123 Id. at 72. 
 124 Id. at 63–64. 
 125 Id. at 8. 
 126 WASHBURN & MENART, supra note 120, at 26. 
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overrun with problems of fear, violence, and neglect, implying that 
reform is needed, not even harsher punishments.127 
C.  Senate Bill 1391’s Removal of Prosecutorial and Judicial 
Discretion in Juvenile Transfer 
Under Propositions 21 and 57, prosecutorial and judicial discretion 
played large roles in whether a juvenile was transferred to criminal 
court or remained in the juvenile system.  Under Proposition 21, the 
decision to transfer was entirely the prosecutor’s, who could directly file 
certain cases in criminal court.128  Proposition 57 curtailed the 
prosecutor’s discretion to an extent, as it required a hearing in front of 
a juvenile court judge before the offender could be transferred to 
criminal court.129  Proposition 57 allowed prosecutors to maintain a fair 
amount of discretion, however, because it was the prosecutor’s decision 
whether to petition the juvenile court for a transfer hearing.130  
Proposition 57 placed the remaining discretion with judges, who then 
had the responsibility to decide whether or not to order the transfer.131  
Embedded in much of the criticism of Senate Bill 1391 is its elimination 
of prosecutorial and judicial discretion to individually assess juveniles 
in favor of a flat ban against transfer for juveniles under sixteen.  
Opponents argue such transfer decisions should be left in the “capable 
and independent hands”132 of judges, giving them the ability to consider 
“the most dangerous cases” on an individual basis.133  Under Senate Bill 
1391, critics say, “there will be no one left to weigh the danger of an 
individual criminal.”134 
1.  Discretion’s Flaws 
While the use of discretion can help ensure that individuals receive 
particularized consideration, it also has several disadvantages.  Biases 
can be a problematic aspect of discretion, especially in the courtroom.  
 
 127 See NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF JUVENILE PRISON (2014) 
(describing the ways in which juvenile detention facilities harm minor detainees, both 
while inside the facility and after release). 
 128 Prop. 21 § 26 (2000). 
 129 Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Rosen, supra note 76. 
 133 See Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior Court, 
Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018). 
 134 Rosen, supra note 76. 
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In addition to lingering explicit biases,135 the legal field has increasingly 
recognized another substantial drawback of discretion, implicit biases.  
Implicit biases are unconscious “implicit social cognitions that guide our 
thinking about social categories.”136  Our implicit biases help us 
“naturally assign people into various social categories divided by salient 
and chronically accessible traits, such as age, gender, race, and role.”137  
Implicit biases consist of both attitudes, which are associations between 
a concept or group and an evaluative valence (positive or negative), and 
stereotypes, which are associations between a concept or group and a 
certain trait.138  Although attitudes and stereotypes are often thought to 
be outwardly held, they may also be implicit.139  Thus, implicit biases can 
come into play automatically, “including in ways that the person would 
not endorse as appropriate if he or she did have conscious 
awareness.”140   
The American Bar Association has implemented an Implicit Bias 
Initiative, which contains a “toolbox” for members of the legal 
profession to use “in exploring implicit bias and approaches to 
‘debiasing.’”141  The webpage contains several resources that can be 
used to understand and test implicit or unconscious biases.142  In 
addition to a general toolkit, the page also provides different toolkits 
specifically tailored for prosecutors, public defenders, and judges.143  
These toolkits contain guidance on how to identify and combat implicit 
biases in a criminal law setting.144  Recognizing implicit biases is so 
important in the legal field because of the role lawyers’ (especially 
prosecutors and judges) decisions play in the lives of others.  Implicit 
biases can influence behavior “in ways that can have real effects on real 
 
 135 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding 
the New York City police department had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by conducting unconstitutional stops and frisks in a racially 
discriminatory manner). 
 136 Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer for Courts, NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS 1 (August 
2009), http://wp.jerrykang.net.s110363.gridserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/
10/kang-Implicit-Bias-Primer-for-courts-09.pdf. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012). 
 139 Id. at 1129. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Implicit Bias Initiative, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Implicit Bias & Prosecutors, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.american
bar.org/groups/diversity/resources/implicit-bias. 
 144 For example, the prosecutor toolkit explains that taking more time to make 
decisions and writing or articulating out loud the reasoning for decisions can help 
combat prosecutors’ implicit biases.  See id. 
CONNELL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/2021  10:54 AM 
2021] COMMENT 893 
lives.”145  Studies have illustrated, for example, the role that race can 
play in criminal sentencing.146 
Discretion is a subjective concept, and several considerations, in 
addition to implicit biases, can impact it.  For example, prosecutors may 
consider several variables when deciding whether or not to prosecute a 
given case.  “Legal, experiential, ethical, and political” considerations 
may all factor into a prosecutor’s ultimate decision whether to 
prosecute.147  While legal considerations, such as whether the evidence 
supports the charges, may be more objective, the prosecutor’s personal 
views can also come into play.148  The prosecutor’s own life experiences 
likely factor into all of his or her decisions, as does the prosecutor’s 
perspective on political consequences and what he or she believes is 
ethically right.149  These inevitable considerations show how a 
prosecutor’s subjective experiences and beliefs impact a decision that 
has the power to change another person’s life. 
The subjective nature of discretion and implicit biases have a 
special impact on juvenile proceedings because whether to transfer a 
juvenile offender to the criminal system is a life-altering decision that 
relies greatly on the discretion of prosecutors and judges.  Some of the 
ways in which prosecutorial and judicial discretion have impacted 
juvenile offenders are evident.  For example, statistics indicate that 
across the United States, racial biases have “negatively impacted 
minority youth” in decisions on whether or not to transfer a juvenile 
offender to criminal court.150  A 2000 study published by the Center on 
Juvenile and Criminal Justice found that the proportions of juveniles 
transferred to criminal court and left in the juvenile system do not 
reflect the same racial breakdown as that for violent crime arrests.151  In 
Los Angeles, the transfer rate for minority youth accused of violent 
crimes is approximately double the transfer rate for their white 
 
 145 Kang, supra note 136, at 4. 
 146 Id. (“[A] few studies have demonstrated that criminal defendants with more Afro-
centric facial features receive in certain contexts more severe criminal punishment.”). 
 147 Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do with It?, 
18 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 744 (2005). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Gabrielle M. Thomas, Note, The Fate of Black Youth in the Criminal Justice 
System: The Racially Discriminatory Implications of Prosecutorial Discretion and Juvenile 
Waiver, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 267, 285 (2016) (noting that minority youth in Florida 
have a higher likelihood of being tried and sentenced as adults in criminal court than 
white youth.). 
 151 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, The Color of Justice: An Analysis of Juvenile Adult Court 
Transfers in California, CTR ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 6 (2000). 
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counterparts.152  Although most prosecutors pride themselves on 
making fair decisions, implicit biases are, by definition, biases that we 
are not aware we carry.153  Additionally, while prosecutors are typically 
considered, and often try to be, more neutral than judges or legislatures 
who traditionally receive pressure to look tough on crime, prosecutors 
may face this same pressure, but “with the additional burden of lacking 
experience in and knowledge of dealing with juveniles.”154  Based on all 
of the considerations, both conscious and unconscious, that factor into 
prosecutors’ and judges’ decision-making processes, the question of 
whether a given juvenile offender will be transferred to criminal court 
is highly unpredictable, inconsistent, and dependent upon discretion. 
2.  How Discretion Has Produced Disparate Results in 
Transferring Youth Across California’s Juvenile Justice 
System 
The subjective and flexible nature of discretion has led to a glaring 
lack of consistency and uniformity across California when it comes to 
which juveniles are transferred to criminal court.  Statistics from 2018 
show disparities between juvenile offenders of different races: youth of 
color are transferred to criminal courts at disproportionate rates.155  
From 2007 to 2016, African American juvenile offenders were eleven 
times more likely to be transferred to criminal court than white 
offenders, while Latino youth were five times more likely than white 
youth.156  Data from 2018 shows that race continued to play a role in 
juvenile transfer, with Hispanic youth representing more than half of 
juvenile offenders transferred to adult court (55.9%), followed by 
African American youth (22.3%), and white youth (17.3%).157  
Disparities also occur along geographic lines, with some counties far 
more likely to transfer certain minor offenders than others; for example, 
juvenile offenders in Sacramento County are nearly twice as likely to be 
transferred to criminal court than the state average, while youth in Yolo 
County are nearly four times as likely.158  On the other hand, juveniles in 
 
 152 Id. 
 153 Kang, supra note 136, at 2. 
 154 WHITE & MOLE, supra note 34, at 9. 
 155 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 115. 
 156 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 14; Gov. Brown Signs Bills to End Sentencing 
of 14- and 15-Year-Olds in Adult Criminal Court, Support Exonerated People After Prison, 
L.A. SENTINEL (Oct. 4, 2018), https://lasentinel.net/gov-brown-signs-bills-to-end-
sentencing-of-14-and-15-year-olds-in-adult-criminal-court-support-exonerated-
people-after-prison.html. 
 157 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 47. 
 158 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 7; L.A. SENTINEL, supra note 156. 
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Los Angeles County are transferred to criminal courts at a rate of about 
half of the state average, while San Diego County youth are transferred 
about at approximately a tenth of the state average.159   
The vast discrepancies in transfer rates along both racial and 
geographic lines exemplify a critical problem with depending on 
prosecutors’ and judges’ discretion in transfer decisions.  Such an 
impactful decision should not depend on arbitrary characteristics such 
as race and county of residence.160  Senate Bill 1391 combats this 
unfairness by implementing an objective standard for juveniles under 
the age of sixteen: they cannot be transferred to criminal court.  In doing 
so, Senate Bill 1391 takes a major step toward eliminating these 
arbitrary disparities and effecting uniformity and consistency for 
juveniles under sixteen years old. 
3.  Senate Bill 1391’s Ban on Transfers of Fourteen- and 
Fifteen-Year-Old Juveniles Appropriately Responds to 
Discretion-Produced Disparities  
While some critics of Senate Bill 1391 have recognized the need to 
reduce bias in the transfer process for juveniles, they argue that 
Proposition 57 successfully addressed concerns about prosecutorial 
discretion by putting the final decision in the hands of a judge.  This 
argument fails to recognize that, under Proposition 57, prosecutors still 
maintained significant discretion in the transfer process, as they still 
determined which juveniles would be subject to a transfer hearing.161  In 
deciding which juveniles were subject to a transfer hearing, 
prosecutorial discretion continued to play a large role in determining 
which juveniles would ultimately be transferred because those subject 
to a hearing clearly have a far greater chance of transfer.  In this way, 
Proposition 57 did not actually take the decision away from prosecutors 
and give it to judges; rather, “the judiciary merely acted as a check on 
the prosecutor’s discretionary decision by ruling on the motions for 
transfer, it did not independently decide which charged youths should 
be subject to the possibility of transfer.”162 
 
 
 159 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 7. 
 160 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 14 (showing that juvenile offenders’ 
chances of being transferred to criminal court are different depending on which 
California county the prosecution takes place in); Males & Macallair, supra note 151, at 6 
(showing that youth of color are more likely to be transferred to criminal court). 
 161 Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016). 
 162 People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 563–64 (Ct. App. 2019). 
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This argument also fails to account for the fact that judges’ 
discretion can be flawed as well.  Although we often trust judges to fairly 
and neutrally carry out the law, they are not immune from implicit 
bias.163  The notion that Proposition 57 effectively addressed 
discretionary issues by putting transfer decisions into the “capable and 
independent hands” of judges ignores biases in judicial discretion.  
Additionally, this argument does not consider whether judges have the 
knowledge of juvenile minds and development that is needed to make 
informed decisions of long-lasting impact for youth.  In Roper v. 
Simmons, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of making 
decisions regarding juvenile sentencing: “It is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”164  If it is 
difficult for expert psychologists to differentiate between juveniles who 
can and cannot be rehabilitated, judges, many of whom lack 
psychological and youth development expertise, undoubtedly will 
struggle with making these distinctions as well. 
The removal of prosecutorial and judicial discretion is warranted 
in light of the difficulty prosecutors and judges will undoubtedly face in 
determining whether to transfer juvenile offenders.  Today, most states 
use the theory of limiting retributivism in criminal sentencing.165  Under 
this theory, judges follow the principle of retribution to identify a range 
of appropriate punishments for the crime, “setting upper and lower 
limits on the severity of penalties that may be fairly imposed.”166  Judges 
then use their discretion to determine what punishment in the defined 
range is appropriate for the individual offender.167  In the criminal 
justice system, judges’ use of discretion to consider the offender’s 
character and any special circumstances is appropriate.  Juvenile 
transfer, however, is a rare case in which the theory of limiting 
retributivism does not work.  Punishments based on retribution are 
fixed by looking at blameworthiness.168  Juvenile offenders, just by 
nature of their youth, are inherently less blameworthy than their adult 
 
 163 See Kang et al., supra note 138, at 1146; see also Implicit Bias & Judges, AMERICAN 
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/resources/implicit-bias 
(providing advice for judges to combat implicit bias by taking more time to make 
decisions, writing more opinions, and participating in statistical trainings). 
 164 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 165 Frase, supra note 68, at 76. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 77. 
 168 Id. at 73. 
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counterparts for the reasons articulated by the Court in Roper169 and 
Miller.170  Their youth and immaturity both diminish their culpability in 
comparison to adults and suggest “a capacity for and a likelihood of 
change.”171 
The significant and lasting effects that sentencing a juvenile as an 
adult can have on the minor make Senate Bill 1391’s complete ban—as 
opposed to the criminal justice system’s traditional method of living 
retributivism—an even more appropriate response to the inconsistency 
that results from discretion and lack of expertise.  The “negative 
labeling” associated with sentencing a juvenile as an adult can have 
harmful and lasting effects on all aspects of the juvenile’s life, including 
“employment, social life, and education.”172  These effects are 
exacerbated because adult criminal court proceedings are open to the 
public, while juvenile proceedings are usually sealed to all but select 
people.173  Juveniles who spend time in adult prisons are also more likely 
to re-offend than those who remain in the juvenile system, making those 
sentenced as adults more likely to end up back in prison.174   
In addition to the effects on their lives after prison, juveniles 
serving sentences in adult prisons are more prone to abuse.  Youth 
offenders incarcerated with adults are at the highest risk of sexual 
assault.175  Minors in adult prisons are also nine times more likely to 
commit suicide than those who are detained in juvenile facilities.176  
Many juveniles who suffer from mental illnesses have less access to 
treatment in adult prisons and, because of their youth, have little 
experience managing the symptoms of their disorders.177  Because their 
brains, including maturity and coping skills, are still developing, 
juveniles have a higher tendency to act out with reckless behavior, 
earning them more aggressive and severe punishments within the 
prison walls as well.178   
 
 169 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 50 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
 170 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010)) 
(“Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s 
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult.’”). 
 171 Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 50 (2010). 
 172 Peterson, supra note 29, at 392. 
 173 Id. at 390. 
 174 Id. at 392. 
 175 Children in Adult Prisons, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (2019), https://eji.org/children-
prison/children-adult-prisons. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
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Whether a juvenile will be transferred to criminal court is a 
decision of the utmost importance in light of these serious and 
devastating long-lasting consequences for juveniles sentenced to adult 
prisons.  As such, a ban on transferring young juveniles under the age of 
sixteen is appropriate to ensure that a wrong decision is not made.  This 
is especially true when the severe impact on the young juvenile is 
compared with the minimal impact that keeping the minor in the 
juvenile system has on public safety.179 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A look at the history of the juvenile justice system in America shows 
that the purpose of the system has been, and continues to be, 
rehabilitating juvenile offenders.180  Senate Bill 1391 furthers this 
objective by ensuring that all juveniles under the age of sixteen stay in 
the juvenile system,181 giving them the best chance at rehabilitation.  
While the constitutionality of the amendment is currently being debated 
throughout California’s lower courts,182 opponents of Senate Bill 1391 
have put forth other arguments regarding public safety,183 holding 
violent youth offenders accountable,184 and the removal of prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion.185  This Comment answers those arguments, 
demonstrating that Senate Bill 1391 is sound both as a matter of public 
policy and criminal law policy. 
Contrary to critics’ assertions, Senate Bill 1391 does not harm 
public safety.  Despite the fear that it will let violent offenders back on 
the street, the amendment does not affect the safety net already in place 
in §§ 1800 and 1800.5, which allow the juvenile system to retain control 
 
 179 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1800.5 (2019). 
 180 See NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, supra note 25, at 157; Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
 181 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2019). 
 182 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555 (Ct. App. 2019) 
(holding that Senate Bill 1391 is constitutional); People v. Superior Court (I.R.), 251 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Senate Bill 1391 is constitutional); People v. 
Superior Court (Alexander C.), 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Senate 
Bill 1391 is constitutional); O.G. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. Rptr. 904 (Ct. App. 2019) 
(holding that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional). 
 183 E.g., Rosen, supra note 76 (“Proponents of Senate Bill 1391 cannot assure you that 
this small subset of 15-year-olds will not kill again. Some will.”). 
 184 E.g., Billingsley, supra note 107 (characterizing Senate Bill 1391 as “not justice but 
a travesty”). 
 185 See, e.g., Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior 
Court, Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018) (criticizing the replacement of 
judicial discretion with “a legislative fiat that prohibits any judge from even considering 
the issue [of whether a juvenile offender should be tried in juvenile or criminal court] in 
these most dangerous cases.”). 
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over juveniles who are deemed physically dangerous even after they 
reach twenty-five years old, the age of release.186  Additionally, juveniles 
who are kept in the juvenile system do not “get off easy;” they are still 
held accountable for their crimes, but in a juvenile facility that is 
specifically tailored to meet the needs of still-developing young 
minds.187  And, in many cases, these juvenile facilities bear a striking 
resemblance to adult prisons.188  Finally, Senate Bill 1391 mitigates the 
disparities among transfers,189 which are likely a result of prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion.  Removing discretion is appropriate in light of 
the difficulty of deciding which juveniles deserve to be transferred and 
the devastating and lasting effects that the criminal system has on 
juvenile offenders.190  Thus, Senate Bill 1391’s critics fail to account for 
many practical realities of the juvenile justice system.  This Comment 
responds to such critics by illustrating that Senate Bill 1391 protects 
juveniles while holding them accountable, maintaining public safety, 
and reducing problems associated with discretion. 
 
 186 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1800.5 (2019). 
 187 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 17–18. 
 188 WASHBURN & MENART, supra note 120, at 8. 
 189 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 6–7, 14; L.A. SENTINEL, supra note 156. 
 190 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 175. 
